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This article analyses mobilization among Hindu nationalist organizations. Rather than seeking their attraction in their discursive outputs and the possible 
answers they might give in times of change, the contention is that this is to be sought in the specific internal dynamics and the possibilities they create 
within their historical context. These specific opportunities for action are inherent firstly in a mode of operation relying on participation and involvement, 
their direct intervention, localness, and accessibility. The dichotomization inherent in violence makes it possible to integrate different interests and discon-
tents under a single banner and therefore contributes to the project of unification undertaken by Hindu nationalism.
The Social Dynamics of  
Communal Violence in India
Julia Eckert, Institute for Social Anthropology, University of Bern, Switzerland
1. Introduction
Communal riots, large scale pogroms and increasingly fre-
quent bomb attacks have shaken India in the last decades. 
Riots, pogroms, and bombings have been interpreted as 
instances of an ever-escalating cycle of violence between 
Hindus and Muslims in the country, a cycle whose histori-
cal beginning is located differently by either side. 
It is particularly Hindu nationalist organizations and authors 
who characterize these violent events as instances of re-
venge or self-defense. They locate the conflicts’ origin in the 
Mughal conquest of India, followed by the partition of the 
subcontinent—both of which are interpreted as acts of Mus-
lim aggression. Among official observers, too, a language of 
mutuality predominates; they identify a cycle of escalation 
in which both sides react to each other. Government reports, 
judges as well as senior police officers have often expressed 
the view that riots between Hindus and Muslims are “like 
epileptic seizures” (e.g. Srikrishna Commission report 1998, 
4), casting them as symptoms of a fundamentally incurable 
disease. Similes of volcanic eruptions further naturalize 
communal violence or locate its sources in a mass psyche.
With regard to communal violence in India, the interpre-
tative screen of escalation conceals more than it reveals. 
Narratives of conflict that focus on escalation, by imply-
ing a certain symmetry between the opponents and equal 
reactive motives that relate to the fear of the other, obliterate 
from view the diverse social dynamics that underlie and 
result from a conflict. The role of perceptions and claims 
of escalation in the social organization of a conflict appear 
to be intrinsic to the “framing” of the conflict, rather than 
describing its dynamics.1
There are several other explanatory narratives about com-
munal violence in India. Many academic authors have 
interpreted communal violence in India in relation to 
sociopolitical changes in Indian society. Culturalist theories 
have proposed that communal violence is an expression 
of culturally different forms of political organization, of 
a cultural resistance to the ubiquitous expansion or “im-
perialism” of an alien concept like democracy and to the 
homogenizing nation-state in a society in which these are 
alien and inappropriate. Or that these forms of political or-
ganization are a perversion of the liberal democratic system 
1 On the implications of assumptions of motives of 
revenge among Muslims see Eckert (forthcoming).
174IJCV : Vol. 3 (2) 2009, pp. 172 – 187Julia Eckert, The Social Dynamics of Communal Violence in India
and its need for the organization of mass-bases for competi-
tive politics. Authors like Ashis Nandy have claimed that 
the modern institutions of mass democracy and secularism 
distorted the modes of social relations of Indian society and 
were therefore responsible for the violence accompanying 
modern politics in India (Nandy 1990; Nandy and Sheth 
1996). Satish Saberwal (1997) and T. N. Madan (1997), too, 
have held that Indian society is governed by traditional and 
deeply religious norms which cannot be accommodated by 
the modern state and its secular credo.
Setting aside such culturalist assumptions, socio-psycho-
logical explanations have pointed toward conditions of per-
sonal anomie in which ideas of charismatic leaders and the 
communities constructed by their ideas offer identity and 
guidance. This line of thought interprets political move-
ments as reactions to processes of socio-cultural change, 
such as the impact of globalization on modes of community 
organization and collective identity. Gérard Heuzé (1995), 
Jim Masselos (1996), and Sujata Patel, for example, have pro-
posed that the social dislocations and upheavals which have 
accompanied economic liberalization in India can help 
explain the increase of communal violence and the appeal 
of identity politics (Patel 1997).
Despite their differences, these authors agree in their inter-
pretation of communal violence as a defensive reaction—
not against the opponent in question, namely Muslims, but 
against the social change effected by globalization or West-
ernization. Communal group conflicts and religiously in-
spired violence thus are seen as defensive reactions against 
experiences of alienation, anomie, relative deprivation, and 
exclusion in the face of rapid socioeconomic change, urban-
ization, individualization, the devaluation of tradition and 
religion (Weber’s “disenchantment of the world”).
These contrasting strands of explanation of the motives 
underlying collective action, as either culturally determined 
or as an attempt at compensation, indicate an understand-
ing of collective violence as a reaction to given conditions. 
They pay little attention to the social dynamics that evolve 
in relation to conflicts within a group, and the possible 
motivation that can arise from them.
The current communal violence between Hindus and 
Muslims in India cannot be understood simply as a defen-
sive reaction against globalization, against alien Western 
institutions, or against modernity as such. This appears 
as implausible for several reasons and cannot provide an 
explanation of how violence serves the role of compensating 
for the experiences of anomie.2 Instead, this article asserts 
that communal violence has to be understood in relation 
to the Hindu nationalist project, which aims at enforcing a 
majoritarian idea of the state within a unity defined by reli-
gious affiliation (see Ludden 1996a, 1996b). The construction 
of the enmity between Hindus and Muslims, Hinduism 
and Islam—and its violent realization—are part of this aim 
of unifying the Hindu population and defining the nation 
against the republican idea established at independence. 
In the pursuit of this aim, Muslims become substitute 
enemies, operational Others. Violence appears as entirely 
endo-strategic,3 and it operates through what Paul Brass 
has described as “institutionalized riot systems” (Brass 1997, 
9). Narratives of a cycle of escalation, of self-defense, or of 
insecurity or an inferiority complex contribute to what Carl 
Schmitt described as the quintessential political operation, 
namely the distinction of friend and enemy (Schmitt 1983 
[1928], 124).
If we consider the identity politics of Hindu nationalism 
as a proactive project, the role of violence has to be newly 
evaluated. The social-psychological phenomena implied in 
the analysis of violence as a reaction to anomie, or those im-
plied in the assumption of a cycle of escalation, are not suf-
ficient. Instead, two aspects of the politics of violence need 
to be understood: the affirmation of local networks (see 
2 Hindu nationalism’s enthusiastic embrace of glo-
balization, especially economic liberalization in In-
dia since the 1990s, appears to contradict those anal-
yses that locate the causes of extreme violence in the 
experience of anomie or alienation. As Thomas Blom 
Hansen has shown convincingly, the appeal of Hin-
du nationalism among the aspiring Indian middle 
classes is part of India’s struggle to gain recognition 
in the global arena (1996a) and to shed its association 
with poverty, underdevelopment, and passivity. 
Rather than wanting to hold globalization at bay and 
protect Hindu tradition, Hindu nationalism is actu-
ally a means to claim global membership—by means 
of excluding those who appear to hold India back. I 
have elaborated on these arguments in Eckert 2003.
3 Elwert 2004, 43; compare Coser 1972.
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Brass 1997; Berenshot [forthcoming]); and the provision of 
opportunities to participate in local power. The capacity of 
violence to bind people to the project of Hindu-nationalism 
is to be sought in precisely these specific internal dynamics 
and the possibilities they create within their historical con-
text. The success of Hindu nationalist organizations thus 
lies not simply in their nationalist credo but in the specific 
opportunities of action and participation that are inherent 
in their mode of operation and form of organization. They 
reset the terms of inclusion and exclusion not solely ideolog-
ically but also in a practical manner offering local possibili-
ties of action. These specific opportunities for action are 
inherent in a mode of operation that relies on participation 
and involvement, direct intervention, and localness and ac-
cessibility. Violence is organized to create participation and 
empowerment among the participants. Participatory action 
achieves an expansion of the space for acting individually 
and collectively. I contend that the specific opportunities 
for action that are created by the politics of violence are 
what constitute its appeal. Moreover, the simple friend/foe 
dichotomization inherent in violence makes possible the 
integration of different interests and discontents under one 
banner and therefore contributes to the project of unifica-
tion undertaken by Hindu nationalism.
2. Hindu Nationalism
Hindutva (Hinduness), the pivotal tenet of Hindu national-
ism, posits the unity of all Hindus beyond any differences 
in the rites or beliefs of different jatis (castes) and sects.4 It 
is unity in diversity, and also in inequality: the Adhikari 
Bheda (lit.: diff erential rights). In the harmonious-hierar-
chical structure of the Hindu caste system, everything and 
everybody has its proper place and proper task.
The idea of unity in diversity found a republican form in 
Nehru’s concept of the state and a multicultural one in the 
thought of the Bengali poet Tagore; and Ramakrishna, a 
religious reformer who first coined the phrase, associated 
it with the syncretistic traditions of Bengal. But in Hindu 
nationalism as it was framed in the 1920s and 1930s by its 
founding fathers Keshav Baliram Hedgewar and Vinayak 
Damodar Sarvarkar, the call for unity and harmony im-
plied the denial and suppression of social conflicts such as 
caste conflicts. Ever since the founding of the RSS (Rash-
triya Swayamsevak Sangh—National Volunteers’ Organiza-
tion),5 the organic concept of the nation with the Brahmin 
head, the Kshatriya arms, the Vaishwa stomach, and the 
Shudra feet of Hindu society has been vital to Hindu na-
tionalist ideology. Evoking unity and union, therefore, was 
always also directed against the articulation of demands for 
equality within the group defined as Hindu.
The historical process of consolidation and canonization of 
Hinduism is part of the genealogy of Hindu nationalism. 
The development of the religious and social order on the In-
dian subcontinent from a highly diverse religious landscape 
with porous borders to a clearly defined and demarcated 
religion named Hinduism (Thapar 1985) was a modernizing 
process consisting of interlocking colonial-administrative, 
cultural-ritual, and political developments. At first, the 
category of Hindu was not religious: it was a denomination 
applied from the outside, and from a geographical perspec-
tive, to all the people who lived “behind the Indus” (Fryken-
berg 1989). In the 1911 census there were still approximately 
200,000 persons who called themselves “Hindoo-Moham-
medans” (Sarkar 1997, 11). Establishing a religious category 
of Hinduism required incorporation of a great variety of 
jatis (castes) and ritual practices and a multitude of gods 
(Sarkar 1997, 277; Basu et al. 1993, 7), whose followers shared 
no common self-designation and which did not add up to a 
unitary religion.
4 In a much-disputed decision in 1995, the so-called 
Hindutva judgment, the Indian Supreme Court 
called Hindutva the “way of life of all Indians”—
thus agreeing with the Hindu nationalist groups’ 
claim. A detailed discussion of the judgment 
can be found in Cossman and Kapur 1997.
5 The RSS was founded in 1925 in Nagpur. Hedgewar 
considered it foremost as an instrument of “cultural 
work” and of character building (Basu et al. 1993, 24). 
It later expanded into a wide-ranging organizational 
network addressing all kinds of social and political 
matters (ibid., 34–50; Jaffrelot 1996; see also Ander-
sen and Damle 1987). Its political wing, earlier the 
Jan Sangh, today the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP—
National People’s Party), was founded in 1951. The 
World Hindu Council (VHP), the international wing 
of the Sangh Parivar dedicated to cultural work, and 
its youth organization, the Bajrang Dal, were estab-
lished in 1964. More sub-organizations with specific 
purposes, including a trade union (founded in 1955), 
several women’s organizations (starting in 1936), 
and the educational network Vidya Bharati with its 
primary and secondary schools, have gained impor-
tance, particularly in their integrating potential. The 
leaders of all organizations, including the BJP, In-
dia’s former governing party, originated in the RSS.
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The colonial administration’s need for classification contrib-
uted to the definition of a uniform category (Pandey 1992, 
23–65). With increasing modernization, group size and 
numbers became politically and administratively relevant. 
“Enumerated communities” (Kaviraj 1992, 50), created 
largely by the colonial census, determined group affilia-
tions unambiguously and exclusively, making multiple or 
situational identifications impossible. At the same time, the 
colonial state assumed a neutral position with regard to the 
religious affairs of the groups defined by its own classifica-
tions and did not interfere in these matters.
These developments led to a codification of specific versions 
of different social practices (Kolff 1992, 231). It was during 
the colonial period, for instance, that the foundation for the 
religious personal statute was laid, which allowed every-
one to settle family issues according to the rules of their 
religion—but only according to the laws of practices rec-
ognized as a religion by the colonial administration. The in-
troduction of separate constituencies for Muslims in the late 
1930s was meant to guarantee their political representation 
in the colonial committees, but it also increased political 
mobilization along religiously encoded group boundaries.
Administrative, cultural-religious, and political projects 
therefore reinforced one another in consolidating group 
boundaries. Administrative categories incorporated the 
classifications of religious self-representations, but only 
those forms of self-representation which complied with the 
criteria of classification of a modern administration system 
(Chatterjee 1995, 223): written form, unambiguity (Kolff 1992, 
215–16, 231), and quantifiability. The categories originating in 
these administratively and politically motivated representa-
tions of Indian society then influenced forms of political 
organization, as the colonial state privileged some forms of 
social organization and ruled out others. Because the colo-
nial powers assumed that community and religious forma-
tions were ultimately not political and indeed profoundly 
characteristic of the nature of the Orient, these organizations 
frequently had wider options for public action than more 
strictly political organizations (Freitag 1989, 284–91).
This colonial privileging of religious and community orga-
nizations, which has often been interpreted as a practice of 
“divide and rule” and which has been held responsible for 
increasing tensions between Hindus and Muslims (Pandey 
1992), would never have been possible, however, had it not 
been able to connect to existing group differences (Freitag 
1989). The distance between Muslim and Hindu political elites 
began to grow in the late nineteenth century. From the very 
beginning, Indian nationalism—organized in 1885 as the 
Indian National Congress—had Hindu religious traits. Key 
personalities supported the positions of the Hindu Right. Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak, for instance, the Maharashtrian Congress 
politician, revived religious and regional rites including Gane-
shotsav, the festival of the elephant-head god, and the birthday 
of Shivaji, a western Indian warrior-king who had successfully 
fought the armies of the Mogul emperor Aurangazeb (Spear 
1990, 172). This revival managed to circumvent the colonial 
ban on political gatherings by mobilizing people for religious 
events. At the same time Tilak used the festivals to counter 
Islamic public rites—particularly Muharram, which was then 
celebrated widely by Hindus as well—with specific Hindu 
festivals, thus shaping a clearly Hindu public (Jaffrelot 1998b).
While the Indian National Congress was able increas-
ingly to present itself to the British colonial government as 
representative of the entire Indian population, references to 
a Hindu India (and an implicit identification of India with 
Hinduism) remained conspicuous in its political rhetoric.
With the religious tone Gandhi introduced into the in-
dependence movement of the Indian National Congress 
from the 1920s on, the fears of Muslim elites about their 
political exclusion from an independent India intensified. 
The Muslim League consolidated as the political representa-
tive of the Muslims of British India and put forward their 
demands for autonomous political representation within 
India (Jalal 1985). The “two nations theory,” proposed by 
Muhammed Ali Jinnah and seized upon by the British colo-
nial government, confirmed the colonial idea of an endemic 
conflict between Hindus and Muslims and justified the 
eventual partition of the subcontinent.6
6 For the history of the partition of the subcontinent 
and the different roles played by the Indian National 
Congress led by Nehru and Gandhi, the Muslim 
League under Jinnah, and the British colonial 
government under Governor-General Mountbat-
ten, see particularly Jalal 1985 and Seervai 1989.
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Independent India inscribed secularism in its constitution 
(articles 27 and 28). It committed itself to religious freedom 
(article 25) and constituted protection of minorities (articles 
29 and 30). It institutionalised the personal laws of different 
religious denominations for matters of family law and in the 
Hindu Civil Code adopted a broad definition of Hinduism, 
which included Jains and Sikhs.7
There were two competing concepts of secularism, how-
ever. Gandhi rejected the separation of state and religion as 
impossible, particularly in India. To him secularism meant 
equal rights for all religions. Nehru, by contrast, pursued 
the classical liberal model of secularism as separation of 
“church” and state. Gandhi’s view predominated and was 
legally institutionalized in various provisions concerning re-
ligious practice (Cossman and Kapur 1997; Upadhyaya 1992).
The Hindu Right’s understanding of secularism follows 
Gandhi’s view but transforms it: because Hinduism is not a 
religion but a way of life, and thus is able to integrate people 
of all religious orientations without proselytizing, tolerance is 
considered the fundamental principle of Hinduism. “When 
Hinduism is no religion and is a way of life, to say that a 
Hindu state is anti-secular is wholly incorrect. [. . .] Hinduism 
is secularism par excellence.”8 Equating Hinduism with secu-
larism as well as presenting Hinduism as a way of life claims 
that it represents all Indian citizens, while at the same time 
limiting membership through religion. For Hindu national-
ists, affiliation to Hinduism, and therefore to India, is defined 
by the concept of punyabhoomi, the holy land. Crucial for 
this vision of the nation was the territorialization of religion. 
In his text “Who is a Hindu?” Sarvarkar in 1923 equated 
“fatherland,” pitribhoomi, with “Holy Land,” punyabhoomi. 
All those who had their sacred sites on Indian soil, including 
Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists, could be considered legitimate 
Indians. Christians and Muslims, whose sacred sites were 
not on Indian soil, were by this definition excluded from 
legitimate political participation. The definitions of affiliation 
to India and participation in the political community were 
based on a territorial understanding of religion.
From the very beginning, the Indian nation was, in the eyes 
of the central organization of Hindu nationalism, the RSS, 
Hindu Rashtra, land of the Hindus.9 “Only the Hindu has 
been living here as a child of this soil,” the movement’s chief 
ideologist Golwalkar wrote (1996, 124). He drove Sarvarkar’s 
definition further, referring explicitly to German National 
Socialism: “Germany shocked the world by purging the 
country of the Semitic races—the Jews. National pride at its 
highest has been manifested here. Germany has also shown 
how well-nigh impossible it is for races and cultures, hav-
ing differences going to the root, to be assimilated into one 
united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindusthan to learn 
and profit by” (Golwakar 1938, 27). The lesson to be learned 
was that “the non-Hindu people in Hindusthan must either 
adopt the Hindu-culture and language, must learn to re-
spect and revere Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but 
the glorification of the Hindu nation [. . .] or may stay in the 
country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation claiming 
nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential 
treatment, not even citizen’s rights” (ibid., 52).
While in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
the disobedience of low castes, the changing role of women, 
and the contestation of the caste system generally  were 
seen as a threat to the unity of Hindus (Sarkar 1997, 288), in 
the subsequent period internal conflicts were increasingly 
neglected in favor of the confrontation with Islam. Hedge-
war had regarded the demands of the low castes for equality 
to be as threatening as those of Muslims (ibid.). But by the 
1930s, in the writings of the RSS leader Sarvarkar, Islam had 
become the paramount threat to Hindus and Hinduism. 
The aggressive inclusivism of the early Hindu nationalism 
changed into an aggressive exclusivism directed at Muslims, 
which veiled the inclusivist strategy toward the unincorpo-
rated castes and sects.
7 Group rights beyond the personal statute, 
however, were linked not to religious groups,but 
to caste affiliation (Scheduled Castes [SC] and 
Scheduled Tribes [ST]; later quotas were es-
tablished for Other Backward Castes [OBCs]). 
Linguistic minorities also enjoy protection.
8 Organiser (January 21, 1996), the mouth-
piece of the Sangh Parivar; quoted in 
Cossman and Kapur 1997, 153.
9 The RSS never participated in the anti-colonial 
movement; its nationalism was not directed 
against the foreign rule. In the 1930s, Hedgewar 
joined Gandhi’s Satyagraha movement and was 
arrested temporarily. He generally disregarded the 
independence movement as generating unrest.
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3. The Construction of the “Other”
The idea that the Muslims of India were “foreign” was based 
on the subcontinent’s conquest by the Moguls. Political 
history was interpreted as a religious characteristic, the 
aggression of Islam. The essentialization of Islam was mir-
rored by the essentialization of Hinduism: where Islam was 
essentially aggressive, Hinduism was essentially tolerant. 
The orientalist glorification of the spiritual (Hindu) India 
(Inden 1990) and the idea of Hinduism’s superiority rooted 
in its inherent tolerance appeared in the nationalist dis-
course as early as 1893, with Vivekananda’s Chicago address 
(Vivekananda 1996 [1893]). It has taken deep root since 
then: the dogma that Islam is aggression and Hinduism is 
tolerance is common in urban India. It is often combined 
with an appeal to the Hindus to defend themselves, despite 
their innate tolerance, against the Muslims, whose religion 
is aggressive, hegemonial, and intolerant. The intolerant 
Muslim in this conception is also the strong Muslim. The 
reverse side of the tolerant Hindu then becomes the weak 
and cowardly Hindu: the positive and the negative sides of 
this self-image are closely connected. The inherent tolerance 
of Hindus turns into a weakness which must be overcome.10
The inferiority complex that some authors have identi-
fied when analyzing Hindu violence against Muslims (e.g. 
Jaffrelot 2003, 12–13) shows itself to be an integral part of 
the ideological discourse of Hindu nationalism. The self-
orientalization inherent in the construction of the Hindu as 
weak, feminine, or defenseless is always connected to the call 
to arms and a justification of violence. The Sangh Parivar’s 
call for violence has been seen as an attempt to construct 
a Hindu identity which abandons orientalist visions of the 
passivity and spirituality of the East (Hansen 1996b).11 And 
yet this call reproduces the orientalist images by referring to 
the Hindus’ alleged essential tolerance. In this discourse, to 
overcome the assumed weakness of Hinduism by way of vio-
lence does not lead to the abdication of tolerance. Since toler-
ance is essential to Hinduism, it is dissociated from specific 
practices. Rithambra, a sadhavi (ascetic) and one of the most 
militant speakers of the Sangh Parivar, said during an elec-
tion campaign of the BJP in Uttar Pradesh: “We are going 
to build our temple there [in Ayodhya], not break anyone’s 
mosque. Our civilisation has never been one of destruction. 
Intellectuals and scholars of the world, wherever you find 
ruins, wherever you come upon broken monuments you will 
find the signature of Islam. Wherever you find creation, you 
discover the signature of the Hindu. We have never believed 
in breaking but in constructing. [. . .] We are not pulling 
down a monument but building one. [. . .] We have religious 
tolerance in our very bones” (quoted in Kakar 1995, 204–5).
This paradoxical construction, which first forms a religion’s 
character through a historical memory (shaped, of course, 
by present concerns) of conquest and violence, and then 
detaches these constructed characteristics from corre-
spondence to reality and thus renders them independent 
of action, is typical of essentializations. Each word of an “es-
sence” abstracts from concrete practices.
Hindu nationalist violence is further neutralized by a dis-
course of defense. Hedgewar had already institutionalized 
paramilitary drill in the Shakhas of the RSS on the pretext 
of defending India against Muslim attacks. Statements by 
BJP politicians, RSS ideologists, and VHP (Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad—World Hindu Council) activists concerning the 
Gujarat pogroms in spring 2002 without exception invoked 
the necessity of defense, and participants in the violence 
insisted that Hindus had always been subject to Muslim 
attacks and that it was “about time to strike back.”12 Each 
pogrom and riot has been accompanied by justifications 
of this type.13 “Nations which do not raise even a finger to 
resist, perish,” remarked Bal Thackeray, leader of the Shiv 
Sena, in his mouthpiece publication Saamna (Dec. 15, 1992). 
He justified the riots of 1993 in an interview with Time 
magazine: “Muslims started the riots, and my boys are 
retaliating. Do you expect Hindus to turn the other cheek? 
I want to teach Muslims a lesson. [. . .] They [the Muslims] 
are not prepared to accept the rules of this land. They don’t 
10 Even Gandhi and his principle of nonviolence 
embody weakness for many—and naturally most 
of all for Hindu nationalists. Gandhi was after all 
assassinated by a long-time member of the RSS.
11 The Sangh Parivar (family) is the as-
sociation of different Hindu national-
ist organisations affiliated to the RSS.
12 Interviews with the author in April 2002.
13 Cf. the reports of different investigating commit-
tees, e.g. the Srikrishna Commission Report 1998.
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want to accept birth control. They want to implement their 
Sharia in my motherland. Yes, this is the Hindus’ mother-
land. [. . .] Have they [the Muslims] behaved like the Jews 
in Nazi Germany? If so, there is nothing wrong if they are 
treated as Jews were in Nazi Germany [. . .].”
The discourse of defense is the rhetorical figure par excel-
lence for resolving the cognitive discord between tolerance 
and aggressiveness. One can be nonviolent in principle 
without renouncing the right to self-defense. In this case 
self-defense is collectivized and generalized: every Muslim 
becomes a symbol of threat, so that even an attack on indi-
vidual, defenseless Muslims can be justified as self-defense; 
and even the smallest conflict can turn into an instance 
of the alleged existential threat to Hindus and Hinduism. 
“Hindutva is not a wave. It is a question of survival of our 
future generations; it is the breath of our life! If a Muslim is 
thrown out of any country, there are other Muslim nations 
where he can take refuge. Where will Hindus go? Except 
for our Hindu nation and neighbouring Nepal, there is 
no other place we can go to. That’s why we have to protect 
our Hindu land, and if need be, sacrifice our lives to save 
Hindutva.”14
The generalization of the threat relies on a diversified im-
age of the enemy: Hindustan is endangered by the mere 
presence of Muslims—by their supposed disloyalty and by 
their imputed terrorism, but also by their many children 
and their poverty. In such an existential conflict, any aspect 
of the everyday life can become a symptom of threat—the 
birth of a Muslim child or a Muslim beggar, Muslims vot-
ing or retreating from public engagement.
After September 11th, 2001, the discourse of defense and 
self-defense in India was reinforced by the global percep-
tion of a ubiquitous threat based in essential difference, 
in a clash of civilizations. Hindu nationalists felt affirmed 
in what they had long advocated, namely that “Islam is 
aggression” and that it was acutely necessary to arm for 
self-defense against it. “As one of the world’s major victims 
of terrorism, India clearly desires to be in the mainstream, 
not at the margins, of the international coalitions against 
terrorism,” wrote Brahma Chellaney, an Indian security ex-
pert who had called previous anti-terrorism efforts of India 
“soft.” He also claimed that India was “a sort of laboratory 
where major acts of terror are first tried out.”15
The confluence of a U.S. narrative of a clash of civiliza-
tions and its long-established Indian (or rather, Hindu 
nationalist) variant asserting the aggressive and intrinsi-
cally militant nature of Islam gave the latter a new status 
of international consensus. When these narratives seemed 
to be confirmed by the events, especially the attack on the 
Indian parliament in December 2001, they spread beyond 
the ideological corner of Hindu nationalism into what is 
frequently called the mainstream.16
In this rhetoric of defense, Hindu nationalist organizations 
become the sole representatives of a just order, the only 
advocates of the rightful claims of Hindus. The majoritari-
anism of Hindu nationalism defines the entity it claims to 
represent (Randeria 1995, 3); it defines its legitimate claims; 
and through the politics of enemy images it asserts the 
superiority of these claims over others. It then maintains it 
is the sole advocate of these claims and, therefore, the only 
legitimate political representation of the people, as defined 
by Hindu nationalism. The legitimate political order is 
equated with the majoritarian claim of ownership of India, 
and all other political parties and the current secular order 
become traitors to the Hindus.
4. The Parliamentary Rise of Hindu Nationalism
The parliamentary rise of Hindu nationalism shows clearly 
how intricately connected the projects of ideological and 
political unification were. Hindu nationalist organizations’ 
parliamentary influence and following began to expand sig-
14 Bal Thackeray in a speech,  quoted 
in Purandare 1999, 341.
15 Chellaney 2001, 97–98. India immediately offered 
to cooperate in intelligence operations and to open 
its military bases and airfields to American forces 
when the United States declared the “war on terror.”
16 Hindu nationalist positions have never been 
confined to members of Hindu nationalist parties 
or organizations. Many of their tenets have been 
popular also among members of oppositional par-
ties, such as the Congress Party. Hindu national-
ist stances toward the Muslim minority of India, 
among them the assertion of the natural aggres-
siveness of Islam and all Muslims, have spread 
so widely that they are taken as commonsense.
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nificantly when, after decades of dominance, the Congress 
Party started to lose power. The integrational strength of 
the so-called “Congress system” (Kothari 1964) had always 
been based on the incorporation of local elites and differ-
ent spheres of interests via networks of patronage (Frankel 
1990). The system began to decline after Indira Gandhi cen-
tralized the party organization, which excluded local elites 
from active political participation (Kohli 1990, 386).
Independent political organizations, representing constitu-
encies usually based on caste affiliation, gained political 
influence in the parliaments and through electoral suc-
cesses. When, in 1990, V. P. Singh’s government introduced 
into law the recommendations of the Mandal Commission 
regarding quotas for “Other Backward Castes,” the BJP 
suddenly vastly increased its following among high-caste 
voters, who were formally disadvantaged by the quota 
policy. This support was particularly marked among the 
urban middle classes, who feared they would be affected 
by the reservation of positions in public service for lower 
castes. For the first time, the assertion that caste politics was 
threatening the unity of Hindus reached a broader public. 
But it also became obvious that this claim addressed very 
particular, urban middle-class high-caste interests.
For some time the following of the BJP remained limited 
to this electorate (Jaffrelot 1998a). Thus the party faced the 
problem of how to expand its base beyond this narrow con-
stituency and to integrate into the project of Hindu national-
ism those social groups whose independent political mobili-
zation seemed to endanger the unity of the Hindus. The BJP 
directly competed with the emerging caste-based parties for 
“all the votes which had been let loose from the shredded net 
of Congress control” (Ludden 1996, b). The suggestion of an 
existential conflict which had been at the center of Hindu 
nationalist thinking became increasingly dominant in 
political discourse. The conflicts between castes, which were 
now being vociferously articulated by lower-caste politi-
cians, were portrayed as irrelevant or at least as secondary 
in the face of the paramount threat of the Muslim presence 
in India. Rather than abandoning caste differences, Hindu 
nationalist rhetoric rearticulated caste relations in the form 
of a healthy body, with its Brahmin head, its Kshatriya arms, 
its Vaishwa body, and its Shudra feet.
4.1 Divisions of Labor
When the BJP came to power in 1998, at the center of an 
alliance of various regional parties, it projected an im-
age of efficient statesmanship and ideological moderation. 
Former Prime Minister Vajpayee of the BJP in particular 
was considered a moderate, experienced national politician. 
But this development did not indicate a general moderation 
of Hindu nationalist ideology when in positions of power. 
Instead, a division of labor emerged between militancy and 
statesmanship: the national BJP took on the role of self-
confident national leadership, while some of its regional 
party organizations—as well as the other organizations of 
the Sangh Parivar, above all the VHP and its youth orga-
nization, the Bajrang Dal—continued their vociferous and 
militant campaign under the mantle of opposition. Dis-
putes and conflicts within the BJP “family” arose about the 
rights of Hindus, the future of Ayodhya, and matters of law 
and order. However, in the long term this division of labor 
served the diverse strategies of mobilization and expansion. 
These conflicts ensured the fulfillment of the complemen-
tary stances of ensuring order and threatening uncompro-
mising militancy within the same ideological fold. Mili-
tancy and order are both essential ideological ingredients 
of Hindutva: militancy in striving to realize an essentialist 
vision of the Hindu nation; order in the vision of a harmo-
nious authentic society replacing a corrupt establishment—
and overcoming the assertion of pluralist and antagonistic 
claims and related Western disorders.
This division of labor between militancy and statesmanship 
made possible the positioning of the national BJP’s brand of 
Hindutva as moderate, a source of order rather than disor-
der, harmony rather than riots. Parts of the BJP’s constitu-
ency were disturbed by the disorder caused by the commu-
nal riots that ravaged India in the wake of the BJP’s yatras 
announcing the political progress of the Hindutva agenda. 
The trading and industrialist community in particular 
feared disruption of the progress of liberalization and viable 
joint ventures. While Hindutva and its radical pronounce-
ments did not lose their appeal as a thought system about 
political legitimacy, and possibly as a vague political model, 
the attendant violence was disturbing. The moderation 
forced upon the national BJP by its political compulsions 
and democratic aspirations was counterbalanced by the 
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militancy of the VHP and particularly its youth organiza-
tion, the Bajrang Dal, as well as regional parts of the BJP 
and other regional Hindu nationalist parties such as the 
Shiv Sena. They assured their public that the upholding of 
law and order would not take priority over the causes of 
Hindutva. The political success of Narendra Modi, Chief 
Minister of Gujarat, after the pogroms in 2002 resulted 
from his capacity to portray himself as representative of 
both aspects of the Hindu-nationalist project: militant Hin-
dutva as well as investor-friendly market orientation.
In 2004 the BJP was—to the surprise of all—voted out of 
power at the national level. The ideological construct of 
unity laid out in Hindutva was not sufficient to persuade the 
lower castes of a common interest with the higher castes. 
The “Shining India” envisioned by the BJP campaign—as-
sociated with the booming new economy, high tech and 
software, shopping malls and jet-set lifestyles—had evident-
ly excluded too many, especially among those who vote.17
The national election of 2009 confirmed the Congress- led 
coalition, again as a surprise to all observers. However, as 
the victories of the BJP in regional elections showed, the ap-
peal of Hindutva did not decrease. Furthermore, Hindutva’s 
conceptualization of Hinduism, along with its identification 
of India with Hinduism, has become commonplace beyond 
its organizational proponents. It has achieved currency in 
many facets of everyday life. In this way the Sangh Parivar 
has achieved its objective, even when its parliamentary 
goals have been thwarted.
5. Making Hindu Nationalist Positions Plausible
Making conflict with Islam plausible to those who are meant 
to be integrated into the Hindu nationalist fold by it is not an 
obvious process. Why should other social conflicts, which 
affect people on an everyday basis and determine their life 
chances and possibilities, become less relevant than a con-
flict that was relatively distant from their everyday lives? The 
experience of caste violence and discrimination was, and 
still is, much more common for many Hindus than conflicts 
with Muslims (Breman 1999). So are the socio-economic 
disparities of Indian society. The plausibility lies not neces-
sarily in the conflict itself but in the specific forms of social 
organization associated with it, both the local networks that 
are activated during collective violence as well as the organi-
zation of the conflict in violent actions.
Violence in conflicts serves to define unity absolutely, be-
cause it firmly establishes group boundaries. It generates uni-
ty symbolically as it affirms the borders between the in-group 
and the “others” that are potential targets of violence. It forces 
people to submit to its categories as there is no other place for 
them to feel safe. Violence ignores individual hybrid, mul-
tiple, or universalist identifications, reducing classification to 
friends and enemies (and sometimes a third group, the audi-
ence). In Indian history, particularly during the experience 
of partition, communal violence has confirmed and realized 
the perception of an existential conflict between Hindus and 
Muslims. After each riot, residential areas become further 
segregated (YUVA 1996). Economic chains of cooperation 
are interrupted and entire industrial sectors are restructured 
(Hansen 1996c, 192; Rai 1998, 73–75; Masselos 1996, 118–21). As 
a result, networks of solidarity that existed in neighborhoods, 
trade unions, or leisure clubs disintegrate.
In many cases following communal violence, social work 
is taken on by religious organizations that do not engage 
directly in communal incitement, but do convey religious 
practices which are “cleansed” of the many syncretisms 
shaping Indian Hinduism and Indian Islam. Today, for 
instance, the Tabligh movement is very active on the Muslim 
side. Many followers attached themselves to its firmly apo-
litical, puritan concept of religion, particularly after the riots, 
because the organization’s political reserve seemed to offer 
protection and to support the retreat into the community. 
But the expansion of the Tabligh movement and its puritan 
concept of Islam also resulted in fewer regional or religious 
festivals being celebrated by both groups together, with Mus-
lims not taking part in Hindu festivals even as guests. This 
reduction in shared social contexts makes it easier to spread 
17 Voting participation has spread to the poorer sec-
tions of the Indian population, to rural voters, and to 
women in the last two decades (cf. e.g. Yadav 2000).
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rumors and stoke fears and prejudices.18 The increased seg-
regation frequently heightens communal tension.
The actual experience of conflict is, however, not the only 
reason for its plausibility. Violence can also bring about 
unity beyond such forced affiliations, by subsuming various 
types of conflict under the umbrella of the friend-enemy 
scheme to forge new political alliances. It often succeeds in 
addressing all divergent interests and social and political 
matters to unite them into one single struggle. The singular 
boundary drawn between “us” and “them” integrates and 
homogenizes the “us” and thus transgresses conflicting 
boundaries within the group it defines. Propounding the 
paramount role of community identity it thus provides 
“integrated identities” (Shah 1994, 1133; Elwert 1989, 451), 
reinforces imagined communities (Anderson 1983) and, 
moreover, by devaluing the “other” it provides groups status 
in which even, or particularly, lower rank members of the 
in-group can partake (Elias and Scotson 1990). 
Moreover, in violent action, established local networks are 
activated and reaffirmed, mutual dependencies are deep-
ened, and obligations are entrenched (Berenschot [forth-
coming]). And finally, the type of violence most common in 
riots—unmediated violence directly involving the perpetra-
tors, operating with weapons at close range, with little threat 
of sanctions—can provide experiences of participation and 
power that in themselves motivate further violent action.
Thus, the social organization of the violence defining the 
conflict operates on several levels: it integrates diverse issues 
ideologically and strategically; it reaffirms and consolidates 
networks of mutual obligations; and it provides space for action.
5.1. The Shiv Sena Party
An example of the social dynamics connected with such 
organization of violence is the Shiv Sena, a Hindu nationalist 
party mainly established in the state of Maharashtra, where it 
had a crucial role in integrating poor and low-caste sections 
of the population into the project of Hindu nationalism.19
The Shiv Sena promotes a violence-oriented, violence-
celebrating type of actionism, and since its founding in 
1966 it has presented itself as a protest movement. The Shiv 
Sena aims to recapture the state on behalf of its legitimate 
citizens, the Hindus, and to guard it from the grasp of “for-
eigners” (here also including the Italian-born leader of the 
Congress Party, Sonia Gandhi).
The fundamental principle of organization of the Shiv Sena 
is its strong local base. Like the organizations within the 
Sangh Parivar, it establishes itself in a dense network of local 
associations, the Shakhas. The Shakhas engage in numer-
ous cultural and welfare activities, mostly short term and ad 
hoc. Through these efforts the nationalist idea of Hinduism 
is spread, popularized, and mixed with local religious and 
cultural symbols. Participants are drawn to these activities 
not necessarily by the political message, but often because 
they want to celebrate a festival, or receive help, or make use 
of educational offers. But the interpretation patterns of the 
conflict are reproduced through them: religious and regional 
celebrations gain a communalist tone; neighborhood festivals 
involve territorial claims of ownership and reproduce criteria 
of exclusion; the numerous martial arts groups associated 
with many of the local branches of the party gain an aura of 
national defense. Because these activities are not explicitly 
centered on the political message, they are even more effec-
tive: They are simply part of everyday practice and leisure 
occupations. Local cultural activities successfully combine 
their political agenda with the institutions, practices, and 
narratives of everyday life and offer to integrate all genera-
tions into a “family.” While the organizations of the Sangh 
Parivar had been limited to the urban middle classes for de-
cades, the Shiv Sena’s ability to open up participation in these 
social and cultural activities has been crucial in expanding 
Hindu nationalism to new constituencies (Eckert 2001).
The social services that the Shiv Sena organizes claim to 
complement the inefficient infrastructure of the state. The 
Shiv Sena’s members, who call themselves the soldiers 
(Sainik) of the movement, assist with minor emergencies, 
18 Members of the Mohalla movement made 
it their business to restore such everyday 
contexts in order to prevent the violent es-
calation of conflicts (Eckert 2003b). 19 The Shiv Sena is not part of the Sangh Pari-
var, but since the 1980s has become one of the 
most successful Hindu nationalist parties. 
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provide ambulances, collect money for local infrastructural 
projects, and so on. Its local leaders and party candidates—
like those of other parties or members of organized crime 
groups—organize for water or electricity connections in 
slums and pay from their own funds for public toilets or the 
paving of streets.20 In turn they expect votes and allegiance. 
The Shakha thus creates mutual obligations: it offers these 
local services in exchange for its clients joining in the vio-
lent agitations that the party organizes (Eckert 2003a, chap. 
1). Recipients of welfare or assistance are expected to enlist 
in the “mob” when one is called for. Every Shakha Pramukh 
(head of a local branch) knows that for his own career in 
the party, command over such dependents is vital: “If you 
can’t provide a mob you are a flop,” said one Pramukh in 
an interview conducted in Mumbai in March 1997. Thus, 
it is not only votes that are exchanged for civic amenities 
and social services (as in the case of other parties), but also 
muscle power and mass.
Such power is not only activated during riots. It also serves 
in more everyday agitations and affirms the Shiv Sena’s 
claim to territorial sovereignty. It is used against rival gangs, 
against political opponents (who might likewise command 
their own mobs), and against those who refuse to subject 
themselves to the Shakhas’ local rule. Thus, when mass vio-
lence needs to be organized, certain structures are already 
in place, including collaborations, lines of command, and 
threats against opponents. These mutual obligations are 
reaffirmed and strengthened during violent agitation.
This diffusion of power to the level of the Shakhas concerns 
a large part of the Shiv Sena’s operations. Every member is 
thereby integrated directly into the organizational life and 
participates in local power and its profits. Sudha Churi, 
former president of the Mahila Aghadi, has expressed this 
principle by presenting violence and the power obtained from 
it as empowerment of the Indian woman: “Bring her out of the 
kitchen,” she described the role of such agitations. Through 
the organizational structure as well as the violent agitations, 
women could be offered a new public role, whose ideological 
embeddedness in the traditionalism of Hindu nationalism 
evaded violating conservative norms or family structures 
(Basu 1995b, 179). Women would delight in newfound power 
over husbands, who have to submit to the arbitrations of the 
Shiv Sena’s family courts or risk being beaten; but they would 
also take delight in organizing and arranging actions, in mak-
ing decisions and carrying them through, in claiming a voice, 
a public role, and local power. This power is always connected 
to the party’s violent agitations and threats, as the local power 
of every single party member is at all times covered by the 
collective power of the organization. The collective power is in 
turn produced by local social and cultural activities.
At the neighborhood level of the Shakhas, the Shiv Sena’s 
collective power became the individual power of the Sainiks, 
who can demand obedience. The attraction of such a role 
is not specific to the Shiv Sena; but the possibilities offered 
by the Shiv Sena to its members are specific to its politics 
of direct action. The party’s internal structure gives impor-
tance and relative autonomy to the local Shakhas, produced 
through the institutions and positions of power which the 
party has formed through violent actions in the public space.
This type of politics, therefore, offers its followers not only 
identity constructs, but real, practical possibilities of action 
and power. By means of the possibilities created by direct 
action, the Shiv Sena fulfils some of the ethos of participa-
tion and empowerment which the (anti-colonial) democratic 
discourse has established as legitimation of the post-colonial 
state (Chatterjee 1995, 216). All the more so because its activi-
ties combine the majoritarian claim of ownership of India 
with criticism of the state. The Shiv Sena acts as a vigilante 
of the “just order” and claims to protect the legitimate order 
by violating the illegitimate laws of an illegitimate govern-
ment with its agitations. Its militant actions integrate all 
conflicts and dissatisfactions with the state as well as with 
the Congress Party, which it tightly identifies with the state.21 
The Shiv Sena joins claims to participation by a rising middle 
class with the political discontent of poorer groups, inte-
grating these contrasting issues and reinterpreting them as 
20 On the question of how these funds are 
generated see Eckert 2003a, 25–30. 
21  Similar processes can be observed in 
other regional contexts, for instance in 
 Uttar Pradesh (Basu 1995; Hassan 1996).
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communal conflicts. Each conflict that involved a Congress 
politician, or the potential electorate of a Congress politician, 
was turned into a conflict in which the Congress Party and 
its representatives became symbols of the state, and the Shiv 
Sena became the advocate of the rights of the people—that is, 
of the Hindus. Through this binary scheme, the movement 
offered new alliances and coalitions to different parties. These 
different parties in turn were strengthened by these alliances 
in their opposition to the Congress Party (or to a party asso-
ciated with Congress). Communal agitation, therefore, served 
the expansion of Hindu nationalism by freshly articulating 
caste and class relations and creating electoral alliances that 
could be used to counter the structures of incorporation of 
the Congress system (Hansen 1996c, 206).
The Shiv Sena’s local electoral successes, which were found-
ed on offers of social services as well as on communal mo-
bilizations, facilitated the rise of persons from social groups 
who used to be largely excluded from the political sphere. 
In Maharashtra, political mobility had for a long time been 
blocked by the Congress Party’s monopoly on political 
posts and career opportunities. The “Congress system”, 
in which a few influential families of the Maratha caste 
had dominated in Maharashtra (Lele 1990), was effectively 
dismantled by the Shiv Sena’s expansion. The party’s offers 
to political newcomers were essential to integrating the op-
position to the Congress Party. Under the broad umbrella 
of Hindu nationalism, the Shiv Sena became the vehicle of 
various oppositions to the Congress Party. Its criticism of 
an inefficient and corrupt polity thus became the legitima-
tion of majoritarian claims, which supersede not only the 
state, but also its norms of legality and legitimacy.
These violent actions and the form in which they were 
justified and organized resulted in the expansion of Hindu 
nationalism and the spread of Hindu nationalist organiza-
tions. First, violence organized through the enemy image 
communalized local social conflicts and subsumed them 
under the “conflict of religion.” Second, violence integrated 
different and frequently contrasting discontents with the 
Indian state as well as communalized criticism of the state. 
And third, violence offered participation and emancipation, 
and opened up new opportunities for action, which parlia-
mentary forms of politics could not.
The integration of the discontents of different social groups 
and their reinterpretation in the Hindu nationalist frame 
have extended the majoritarian concept of the Indian polity 
beyond its initial constituency. Hindu nationalist mobiliza-
tion and the omnipresence of majoritarian patterns of legiti-
mation have brought about a sustained shift in the criteria 
of political legitimacy, standards of normality, and the right 
to plural and particular claims. They have not superseded 
other forms of political articulation and have not unified 
the Hindu population as much as they desired. However, 
they have normalized perceptions of a conflict with Mus-
lims and the perception of India as ultimately a Hindu state. 
They have substituted the republican idea of the state with a 
religiously encoded majoritarianism, and have successfully 
advanced the canonization of Hinduism (Thapar 1985).
6. Epilogue
There has been much debate in India about whether com-
munal violence is an expression of a Hindu mass move-
ment, or whether it is cleverly manipulated and orchestrated 
by Hindu nationalist organizations (Basu 1995a, 35–78). 
Both are true: Hindu nationalism and its twin, commu-
nal violence, are mass movement and orchestration at the 
same time. The link between the two consists in the role of 
violence.
To describe violent actions simply as orchestrated misses 
the way such orchestration actually operates, how it 
convinces those that follow its call, and how it manages to 
entrench itself in the social relations and social imagination 
of the participants. And to describe communal violence 
simply as “troubles,” or to confine it to a matter of two 
religious groups’ mutual hatred, would deny the striking 
asymmetry between the groups—in the number of victims, 
but chiefly in the support of state authorities—as well as the 
systematic nature of the riots.
Pogroms like the ones in Gujarat in 2002 or those in 
Mumbai in 1993 do not happen because sentiments of hate 
suddenly break out. Close examination of a pogrom or riot 
quickly makes clear how crucial organization is. In a recent 
publication of the small news agency Tehelka, numerous 
members of Hindu nationalist organizations brag about 
their role in the riots. While expressing sentiments of 
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revenge, they speak of the planned nature of the assaults on 
members of religious minorities. The attackers, who arrived 
in lorries and were armed with petrol cans and weapons, 
had computerized lists of the residents that labeled their 
religious affiliations (Jaffrelot 2003, 12). Gujarat’s VHP 
president admitted to having drawn up such a list on the 
morning of February 28. The Shiv Sena had similar lists in 
Bombay in 1993. VHP chief Jaideep Patel declared after the 
confiscation of swords and tridents in Gujarat: “We’ve been 
distributing these weapons since 1985. [. . .] Nobody has 
objected, not even the police.”22 It is obvious that implicit or 
open support by the government is decisive for the course of 
such riots (Engineer 1996, 130). “No riot can last longer than 
24 hours if the state does not want it to,” Police Inspector 
Vibhuti N. Rai insisted.23 Rioters report that the police sur-
rendered, indeed handed over Muslims—men, women, and 
children—to the attackers.24 Police officers recount orders 
not to interfere against the violence;25 judges explain how 
they managed to let off the few rioters who were charged.26
The involvement of state authorities, particularly the police, 
and the BJP government’s refusal to end the pogroms as 
well as its explicit expressions of approval of the violence 
further manifested the claim of ownership of India, the 
majoritarian prerogative, and the “illegitimacy” of Muslims. 
The authorities’ actions show clearly how far this claim of 
ownership has spread already, and how self-evident it has 
become for diverse sections of the Indian population.27 “The 
violence in Gujarat reflects the dissemination of hatred of 
the Other that had never before reached such intensity [. . .] 
or had ever been so widespread,” writes Christophe Jaffre-
lot, agreeing with Ashis Nandy that this violence marked 
the beginning of a new phase in Indian politics (Jaffrelot 
2003, 17). This new phase is characterized by the normaliza-
tion of those Hindu nationalist claims that justify violence 
such as that perpetrated in Gujarat in 2002.
The characterization of the Muslim not only as foreign 
but also as aggressive—and in this respect fundamentally 
different from the Hindu—is pivotal for the construction 
of Hindu nationalism and the justification of violence. The 
conflict continues to be portrayed as an essential one, a 
“clash of civilizations,” and as a question of the survival of 
Hindus and Hinduism. If enmity is an essential character-
istic of the relationship between two groups, or if it is made 
out to be the characteristic of one culture as in the case of 
Islam, it becomes possible to continually reformulate the 
conflict, to adapt it to local and current opportunities, and 
ultimately to to keep on re-enacting it. Ayodhya is only 
one symbol of the allegedly essential and therefore non-
negotiable conflict between Hinduism and Islam. Such 
symbols are potentially infinite in number: Hindu national-
ist organizations have another three thousand mosques on 
their list, and they no doubt will find still other symbols for 
the conflict.
22 Patel in an interview with In-
dian Express, April 10, 2002.
23 Vibhuti N. Rai in an interview published in 
Combat Communalism 2 (6), February 1995.




27 The reports from Gujarat note the participa-
tion of broad sections of the population on a new 
scale. Even the middle classes, it was said, had 
taken part in the pogroms, the arson attacks, and 
the hunt for Muslims. It was never entirely true 
that communal violence was only the lumpenpro-
letariat’s doing, as is often claimed by these same 
middle classes. It was among the middle classes 
a that the views of Hindu nationalism first found 
a sympathetic ear and the BJP was able to recruit 
its voters. The Hindu nationalist organizations 
are made up mainly of middle-class members.
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